Nile Dam Tripartite Agreement: Who loses and who benefits?

Ethiopia: Nile Dam Tripartite Agreement: Who loses and who benefits?

Why we should not celebrate too soon

By Aklog Birara

“Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits there from, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.” -
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, UN General Assembly resolution 49/52 of December 1994

I read the full text of Principles Al-Ahram, Egypt’s leading newspaper posted on the Nile Dam Agreement. The Agreement is a celebration for Egypt but of questionable efficacy for Ethiopia. This historic document was arrived at after a series of consultations at the highest levels of government and State on the Egyptian side; and signed on March 23, 2015 by Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn of Ethiopia, former Field Marshall turned President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi of Egypt and President Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir of Sudan.

The Abbay River is dear to me and to millions of Ethiopians. In light of this, I had written a series of papers under the title ... ... .. in favor of Ethiopia’s fundamental rights to harness its water resources for the benefit of its own people; and urging Egypt to stop its belligerent, hostile, militaristic and bellicose approach in dealing with Ethiopia and other Sub-Saharan Africa riparian states. I had urged Egypt to rejoin the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) that it abandoned for five years. Refusal resulted in the unintended consequence of cementing relations among Black African riparian states. Sudan moved out Egypt’s spell and Egypt stood alone.

After listening to the Egyptian position and strategy of scuttling any form of “hydropower hegemony in Africa”---a clear reference to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) ---in Doha, Qatar, I came to the conclusion that Egypt would do everything in its power to preserve its colonial based agreement of “historic and natural rights.” The question in my mind was what tactic it would deploy to achieve this? Finance opposition groups as it has done in the past? Use military force as the former President of Egypt Morsi had indicated? Accept the dramatic geopolitical and economic forces that are transforming Sub- Saharan Africa and creating new alliances in place of old ones? Opt for diplomatic solutions by restoring normal relations with Sub-Saharan African countries, including its primary traditional adversary, Ethiopia?

We now know the answer. For the first time in decades Egypt faces enormous challenges within and without. Renewed interest in Sub- Saharan Africa and more willingness to use diplomacy in protecting its national security interests reflects dramatic changes in the Arab world, the fragility of the country and the unease in the body politic within Egypt, and economic transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Equally, the government led by Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn faces enormous political and economic challenges. Part of this challenge is perceived military threat from Egypt, internal political tensions and shortage of foreign exchange. In one of my articles on the subject, I had said the following concerning Morsi’s military solution. “Experts agree that his short-lived Presidency was well known for its frightening extremism calling for military intervention in Ethiopia and Syria. It seems to me that, in the long-run, Ethiopia and Egypt would benefit more from cooperation than confrontation. However, given the current turmoil in Egypt and continued repression in Ethiopia, no one really knows how the contentious issue of the Nile would end. One question to ponder is the extent to which the Egyptian military establishment’s position is radically different from that of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood?”

It is reasonable to entertain the notion that the former Field Marshall decided to opt for diplomacy by giving a little, recognition of the GERD.

Egypt’s Diplomatic Coup

The “good news” is that Egypt has rejoined the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). Second, Egypt has been forced to acknowledge Ethiopia’s right to build the GERD. In principle, The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement that the Ethiopian Parliament ratified in 2013 replaces the 1929 Colonial Agreement that gave Egypt and Sudan the lion’s share of Nile waters. So, in this sense history is on Ethiopia’s side. In theory, Egypt is in no position to impose all sorts of conditions on Ethiopia if it accepts the Framework; and unless the Ethiopian government falters for its own reasons. A cursory review of negotiations and studies by Egyptian experts since 2011 shows that Egypt was determined not to give an inch with regard to water flows; and, as an insurance policy, decided to have a say in the administration and monitoring of the GERD itself. Article 5 of the Agreement gives Egypt a window of opportunity to have a say in Ethiopia’s project. “The principle of the Dam’s storage reservoir first filling, and dam operation policies,” binds signatories “To apply the recommendations of the international technical experts committee and the results of the final report of the Tripartite National Technical Committee during different stages of the dam project.” It further confirms “The three countries should cooperate to use the final findings in the studies recommended by the Tripartite National Committee and international technical experts to reach:

a) An Agreement on the guidelines for different scenarios of the first filling of the GERD reservoir in parallel with the construction of the dam.

b) An agreement on the guidelines and annual operation policies of the Renaissance Dam, which the owners can adjust from time to time.

c) To inform downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan, on any urgent circumstances that would call for a change in the operations of the Dam, in order to ensure coordination with downstream countries’ water reservoirs.

--Accordingly, the three countries are to eestablish a proper mechanism through their ministries of water and irrigation.

--The timeframe for such points mentioned aabove is 15 months from the start of preparing two studies about the dam by the international technical committee.

My reading is that Egypt and Sudan will be in a position to exercise substantial right in the “filling of the reservoir” and the “operational policies” of the Dam. Is this not a surrender of Ethiopia’s sovereignty and national security to Egypt? What is the difference between the Colonial period protocol of giving veto power to Egypt and this Agreement? Is this not ceding Ethiopia’s sovereignty over a national project housed on Ethiopian territory and river over which Ethiopia should be the only power that dictates the construction and operation of its own dam as long as it is done in a responsible manner? Doesn’t Egyptian absolute oversight and interference in Ethiopia’s internal development administration reaffirm Egyptian claim of “historic and natural rights” over the Abbay River? What happens in the event that water flow to Egypt decreases during different stages of the “first filling of the GERD?” Does the Agreement not offer a free hand to Egypt to demand

Source: Nazret